

The Army National Guard and Transformation: Relevance for Ongoing and Future Missions

**A Monograph
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Abstract

The Army National Guard and Transformation: Relevance for Ongoing and Future Missions
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Increasingly, since the end of Desert Storm, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has conducted more overseas missions with fewer resources. In operations since the events of 9/11, mobilizations are at their highest levels since World War II. The ARNG has done this using a “Cold War” force structure and mobilization process to “call-up” units and individuals “as needed” while simultaneously supporting domestic missions. Most agree that the ARNG must change in order to meet the expectation that it is now required as an operational force vice a strategic reserve. The primary question this monograph seeks to answer is how should the ARNG change to meet this new role? Some advocate a return to a strategic reserve role or specializing portions of the ARNG to meet specific needs in Stability and Civil Support Operations. The Army is suggesting transforming the ARNG through three initiatives that will provide capabilities based solution vice specializing force structure for specific missions. The ARNG transformation approach appears to provide the best solution for operating in the new environment. However, in order for this transformation to be functional the Army and the ARNG must overcome traditional issues based on their relationship that dates back to the early 20th Century. The ARNG fills a dual role and has an expectation to respond to domestic as well as foreign contingencies. The operational nature of the ARNG now requires that domestic mission planning receive the priority that overseas contingencies receive to allow alignment of resources with tasks across the spectrum of operations. Further, that the Army must resource the ARNG to its full level of requirements vice the previous method of tiered funding. Addressing these two issues allows the transforming ARNG to function properly as an operational force as required for national security.

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ACRONYMS

ARNG – Army National Guard

COE – Current Operating Environment: alludes to operations the ARNG are involved in across the spectrum of operations (Combat and Stability Operations overseas and Civil Support Operations domestically).

CSO – Civil Support Operations: alludes to all missions and operations that occur domestically in supporting civilian operations. While Homeland Defense is a separate mission that occurs domestically it will be referred to here for ease of discussion.

CBT A – Combat Arms: Infantry, Armor, Aviation, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Special Operations and Combat Engineers.

CBT S – Combat Support: Chemical Corps, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Signal Corps, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations of Special Forces.

CBT SS – Combat Service Support: Medical, Transportation, Judge Advocate, Acquisition, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Finance, Adjutant General, Chaplain and some types of Engineer and Aviation units.

JSCP – Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review

SO – Stability Operations: refers to operations conducted overseas in support of foreign governments and not directly combat related.

INTRODUCTION

“This is because of a deliberate national strategy to under-equip and under-resource the National Guard as a strategic reserve. And now we have proven that we are an operational force and will be an operational force for the foreseeable future.”¹

Increasingly, since the end of Desert Storm, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has conducted more overseas missions with fewer resources. In operations since the events of 9/11, mobilizations are at their highest levels since World War II. The ARNG has done this using a “Cold War” force structure and mobilization process to “call-up” units and individuals “as needed.” ARNG units have dealt with this increased mobilization in combination with the unprecedented domestic response for disaster relief support in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The ARNG traditionally fulfills this “dual” role of supporting the Army as a strategic reserve for overseas deployments, while simultaneously conducting support to civil organizations domestically without much difficulty. The legacy force structure and resource model of the ARNG worked in the context of the previous century’s security environment. However, recent operations and domestic expectations have changed to the point where this dual role strains the ARNG as an organization and calls into question its ability to continue supporting federal and state missions simultaneously. This strain is due in part to a system that still treats the ARNG as a strategic reserve, even though it now an operational entity.² Indications are that this tension will continue and likely worsen if the ARNG remains with its current force structure and resource model. Therefore, the ARNG must adapt as an organization to fit this new environment and the expectations that come with being an operational force. The question is how this should be done?

There are advocates for assigning a portion of the ARNG a permanent role in Stability Operations (SO) or Constabulary missions. Some advocate a primarily domestic focus on Civil Support Operations (CSO) with a strict strategic reserve role for overseas deployments. A 2004 National Defense University study calls for the separate organization of a Stability and

¹ Blum, LTG H Steven, Chief NGB, National Guard Magazine, Vol 60, Feb 2006, p.21.

² Ibid, p.21.

Reconstruction Force with one ARNG Division reorganized for this specific mission.³ Another suggestion has been to create a Constabulary Force that is a mix of civilian and military police that would assist in the transition from major combat to stability operations.⁴ The ARNG would play a large role in a Constabulary Force according to this suggestion. In both suggestions, the ARNG would still be required as a strategic reserve and would continue to support domestic missions. Army Leadership previously advocated the ARNG focus on domestic operations, “It has been suggested before that the National Guard be reorganized to focus on domestic missions. In preparation of the 1997 QDR, Army leadership proposed reducing the combat role of NG units and stressing support functions (e.g. logistics, communications, military police and engineers).”⁵ The Hart-Rudman Commission advocates this as well, “In 2000, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) recommended reducing the NG’s emphasis upon potential overseas combat deployments and increasing its attention to domestic incident capabilities.”⁶ The commission further recommended, “that the National Guard be assigned homeland security as ‘a primary mission’. The Hart-Rudman Commission concluded that the Guard should be ‘reorganized, trained and equipped to undertake the mission.’”⁷ These recommendations appear sound but indicate a myopic solution to solving the problems occurring right now. These suggestions offer an industrial era solution of creating specific organizations for a specific set of problems. Army leadership has since changed its recommendation and advocates a different solution.

³ Binnendijk, Hans and Stuart E. Johnson, ed. *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Apr 2004.

⁴ Perito, Robert M., *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004. See pp 323-337 for an extensive discussion of this proposal.

⁵ Doubler, Michael D. *The Army National Guard and Homeland Security*, Arlington, VA: AUSA, Dec 2002, p 18.

⁶ Bowman, Steve and Lawrence Kapp. *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*. Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 19 Sep 2005, p CRS-15.

⁷ Doubler, Michael D. *The Army National Guard and Homeland Security*, Arlington, VA: AUSA, Dec 2002, p 18.

The current Army leadership recognizes that the previous paradigm needs to change and they have launched an aggressive plan to “transform” the Total Army (Active and Reserve Component) to support current and anticipated roles. The Total Army will now share in both foreign and domestic missions. The fundamental difference from previous solutions is that the Army change shapes itself as a more information age structure. Highlights of the solution offered are to “flatten” command and control mechanisms and provide forces on a cyclic rather than as needed basis. Most important though is the Army leadership belief that a “modular” force, structured to react to all missions and roles assigned, provides more capability than splitting the organization into a mission specific, “as needed” force. The leadership of the ARNG agrees and is pursuing these initiatives to transform but with further concerns. While the Army plan for Transformation appears sound, it must address a couple of legacy issue that otherwise could weaken and unhinge their solution. The ARNG relationship to the Army, existing successfully for over a century, does not match the current or anticipated reality in several key areas.

These key areas are in domestic planning and resource allocation. Previously, the ARNG supported domestic missions on an “ad hoc” basis as long as this support did not affect their ability to perform their federal mission. The reality, however, is the ARNG is now an operational entity for the Army overseas while domestic support missions have received priority since the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Further, resource allocation for the ARNG must be at the same level as Active Component forces in order to operate as expected under the Modular concept, which has not been the historical norm. Resources for the ARNG, prior to 9/11, were at a level that kept it functional but certainly not optimized to operate at the rate they are now. The dual role of the ARNG is still a viable concept but only if the force structure and domestic planning efforts are realistically resourced. Therefore, it is important to understand the context of these issues in how the ARNG must change as an organization. The decisions made now will have implications for the ARNG for the near future and beyond. The policy makers and resource

planners at all levels of the US Government must understand the capabilities and limitations of the ARNG to allow this organization the opportunity to meet its national security obligations.

The discussion that follows addresses these issues in detail and leads to the recommendations based upon understanding the unique role the ARNG fills for the United States. In Chapter 1, the focus will be on how resource and time intensive SO are and will continue to be in the near term. This is important towards understanding the fallacy of creating specific structures or units within the ARNG for specific missions. Chapter 2 looks at Army doctrine and outlines the myriad of stability unit tasks and civil support missions at the unit level. Inversely, Army doctrine also understands the tasks at the individual soldier level are surprisingly similar across the spectrum of operations. This is important in showing that proponents of mission specific force structures take too narrow a view of SO and CSO tactical unit tasks. Therefore, creating or specializing units for tactical tasks is not necessary or prudent given the real constraints of the current environment. However, understanding if the proposed ARNG force structure under Transformation has the capability to conduct SO and CSO tasks are relevant to the current operating environment.

Chapter 3, therefore, outlines three separate but linked concepts that define ARNG Transformation. These concepts are Modular formations, Force Generation and AC/RC Rebalance, which align Combat Arms (CBT A), Combat Support (CBT S), and Combat Service Support (CBT SS) force structure to facilitate operating both in overseas and domestic operations. The discussion shows these concepts reasonably provide an overall capability to operate across the spectrum of tasks and missions, both foreign and domestically. While the ARNG is already in the process of transforming according to this plan, there are concerns that they will not fully reach the capabilities proposed because of planning and resource paradigms, which Transformation does not address. Current indications show that the Army is seeking to cut back on ARNG Transformation. Current reality, however, does not support this trend “The Army is weighing options that would scale back its planned growth by at least one active-duty and six National

Guard brigades over the next year to keep its modernization programs on track, defense officials say.”⁸ “Current projections by Pentagon officials indicate as much as \$32 billion in defense budget cuts resulting in an \$11.7 billion shortfall for the Army through 2011...at the same time, the estimated cost of transformation has grown from \$28 billion in 2004 to \$48 billion in 2005.”⁹ This follows the historical reality of limiting ARNG resources to provide for Active Component (AC) needs and future Army acquisitions. The previous security environment allowed the ARNG to be under-resourced by DOD and the Army but the COE does not and so breaking this previous relationship is necessary.

In Chapter 4, the discussion turns to the unique resource relationship that the Army and the ARNG have shared since the beginning of the 20th Century. Legislative and policy decisions made this relationship effective and did so at a limited cost in the previous security environment. However, this relationship must fully transform to meet the current operational needs. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons why this resource and planning paradigm came about and how it will affect the ability of the ARNG Transformation to be effective in the manner proposed. Understanding the current conundrum of deficient domestic planning and resource deficiencies related to an operational organization that operates on a “cold war” structure and readiness model is paramount. This leads to the recommendations in Chapter 5, specifically; the Army and the ARNG must transform how they plan for all missions, both foreign and domestic. An organization must have sound plans for likely contingencies, so it can make prudent decisions on organizing itself to meet its obligations. Therefore, domestic mission planning leading to prioritized unit and individual tasks are key components in how the ARNG can support the federal and state governments in relation to SO and CSO. Domestic contingency operations must receive the equivalent planning effort and methodology that other regional combatant commands

⁸ Jaffe, Greg. *Army Weighs Slower Troop Growth To Keep Modernization on Track*, Washington, D.C.: Wall Street Journal, 7 Dec 2005, pp. 3.

⁹ Schlesing, Amy, *Units See Shortages as Guard Follows Army Reorganization*, Little Rock, AR: Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, 15 Jan 2006, pp 1.

receive. This would require NORTHCOM to prepare “war plans” that tie specific units to a domestic contingency based upon their availability. This would align the domestic and foreign missions, and their subsequent mission and task sets, and allow for better risk mitigation, prioritized planning and sourcing based on likely future contingencies.¹⁰

Subsequently, transforming the resource requirements to match the needs of the organization proposed for the next generation. If this Transformation falls into the “old” planning and resource paradigm, then based on historical realities, it will likely produce the same tensions that the ARNG and the Army experience now. However, if it truly matches resources with requirements, it will do more to create SO and CSO capability and still fulfill the “primary” mission of fully integrated ground capability. An organization that has a *set of plans for all its likely missions, resources to match its requirements*, and is organized to *operate over time and space* provides an organization that is capable, flexible and fiscally prudent enough for the needs of the U.S. National Security.

¹⁰ Beltran, Ricky, Colonel. Chief, Modular Coordination Cell, National Guard Bureau, *Personal Interview*, 14 Nov 2005.

FORCE STRUCTURE SIZE ISSUES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Creating separate force structure, as it relates to SO, suffers two problems. One is the spatial factor of time and the other is in the size of the organization. The logic flows that inserting forces in an austere environment will more than likely require combat arms forces to provide the early entry and securing of the weak state. This will then allow a constabulary force to theoretically fall in behind in a timely manner, which serendipitously would coincide with an alert and mobilization of an ARNG constabulary or stability unit. However, operations are simultaneous now, not sequential, and an organization must be flexible and adaptable enough to operate across the full spectrum of operations immediately. A separate organization, by its nature, will force the US Military back into a phased planning construct. It would push valuable CBT S and CBT SS assets back into the Reserves, thus limiting the options available to a combatant commander and predetermining his task organization, by the nature of the organization. In the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the SECDEF implied having too much CBT S and CBT SS in the reserves hampered his effort, to the point that he authorized an ad hoc system of mobilization versus the accepted Time Phased Force Deployment (TPFDD) that the Total Army had trained on for over a generation. An austere environment, as the initial post occupation of Baghdad showed, requires a wide array of force capability as quickly as possible. “Our joint doctrine requires phased operations, which leads us to believe there is and always will be a distinct demarcation between major combat operations and stability operations. It would be helpful if the insurgents and terrorists we encounter would follow the same doctrine, but they have not in Iraq, and they will not in the future. Transitional indicators associated with the full spectrum of operations against a campaign plan tailored for the environment might be a better method of conflict evolution.”¹¹

¹¹ Chiarelli, MG Peter W. and MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, *Winning the Peace, The Requirement of Full-Spectrum Operations*, Military Review, July-August 2005, p 16.

The other problem of having a separate stability organization within the ARNG would be how big to make it? “It is sometimes difficult to anticipate the force size and the time required to restore and maintain order in a failed or failing state. The force size is driven by two demographic revolutions of the last decades: dramatic growth in the populations of troubled states, and the movement of a considerable portion of that population to the cities.”¹² These operations are long and difficult making force sizing a struggle to manage. “Over a range of stability operations in which opposition has not progressed to the stage of mobile warfare by main force units, the size of stabilizing forces is determined by the size of the population and the level of protection or control that must be provided within the state...The ability to generate forces for a stability or peace enforcement is a most necessary condition for success – for even successful political strategies in such conditions have a military component. The generation of forces is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving stabilizing objectives.”¹³

“In the past decade, as civilian populations in underdeveloped states have exploded, the size of American and allied military forces has declined significantly. Interventions to restore and maintain order and stability place military forces squarely at the juncture of these two trends.”¹⁴ A review of historical occupations and SO bears this out. Successful SO, such as Germany (1.6 million U.S. Troops)¹⁵ and Japan (350,000 Troops)¹⁶, require troop levels that are just not sustainable by the U.S. Military of today. Stability operations since, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, have U.S. troop strengths ranging from 28, 000 to 10,000¹⁷, respectively at their peaks. These operations have outcomes ranging from failure to outcome pending in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan, to mild success in Bosnia and Kosovo but even those

¹² Quinlivan, James T. *Force Requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, Winter 95, p 59.

¹³ Ibid, p 60-61.

¹⁴ Ibid, p 67.

¹⁵ Dobbins, James, et. al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003, Table S.1.

¹⁶ Ibid. Table S.1.

¹⁷ Ibid. Table S.1.

countries have major underlying issues that will require an international presence for an extended period. "...what principally distinguishes Germany, Japan, Bosnia and Kosovo from Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan are not their levels of Western culture, economic development, or cultural homogeneity. Rather it is the level of effort the United States and the international community put into their democratic transformations. Nation-building, as this study illustrates, is a time - and resource - consuming effort."¹⁸ Extending this into future operations, "Stabilization operations can be labor intensive...The United States will sometimes have ambitious goals for transforming a society in a conflicted environment. Those goals may well demand 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants...working for five to eight years. Given that we may have three to five stabilization and reconstruction activities underway concurrently, it is clear that very substantial resources are needed to accomplish national objectives."¹⁹ Using current examples of an ongoing operation like Iraq and a possible operation like Sudan are useful.

With a formula of troops required for Ambitious Goals (20 troops/1,000 people) and Less Ambitious Goals (5 troops/1,000 people) reveals unsustainable numbers for a separate stability or constabulary force, within current end-strength constraints. Iraq Population: 26,074,906, Troop Strength for Ambitious Goals: 521,498, and Troop Strength for Less Ambitious Goals: 130,375 (which is consistent with current troop levels in Iraq). Sudan Population: 40,187,486, Troop Strength for Ambitious Goals: 803,750, Troop Strength for Less Ambitious Goals: 200,937.²⁰ Other likely contingencies like North Korea with a population of 22,912,177 people or Iran whose population is triple of North Korea at 68,017,860 people gives a sobering realization as to the scope of attempting SO in these countries. The numbers indicate that operations such as these

¹⁸ Ibid. pp xix.

¹⁹ Logan, Justin and Christopher Preble, *Failed States and Flawed Logic, The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office*. Policy Analysis, No 560, 11 Jan 2006, p 17...cited from U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, Supporting Papers*, January 2005, p. 63, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-01-DSB_SS_Transition_SupportingPapers.pdf.

²⁰ Ibid. Table 3, p 18.

require large amounts of troop strength in comparison to current end-strength problems. The problem grows larger when you consider that for every soldier in a theater conducting SO, you need two additional soldiers. One soldier training to replace the person in theater and one soldier returning for retrain and refit. Given that, the end-strength for the Army Total Force will not grow significantly due to fiscal constraints²¹, why split your limited force into major specialized units that are resourced and trained separately?

Since the force is limited, yet the SO and CSO missions are not going away, it would seem to be a contradiction, the separate organization proponents would say. How can you conduct SO and CS missions with an ARNG force structure that is geared towards major combat? The argument for specialization is often based on the idea that SO and CS require a different set of skill sets by the soldier that are not conducive across the spectrum of operations. The argument goes, because SO and CS are “unique” missions, with “unique” tasks, it requires separate force structure that can be trained and equipped for these operations. The lack of proper planning and coordination within the U.S. Government led to the issues we face in SO. If the soldier is given the opportunity to train on SO and CSO tasks they have historically proven to be adapt at changing and doing the tasks quite well. Therefore, it is useful to discuss how the tactical and individual tasks related to SO and CSO have a linkage to how the ARNG operates for all operations, with the understanding this linkage is often unrelated to specialized force structure. “All recent peace operations have relied on infantry-heavy units, either pure infantry or mechanized infantry. Other types of units, such as military police, civil affairs, and psyops, have carried out critical functions, but in manpower-intensive situations such as stability operations,

²¹ Bruner, Edward F. *Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?* Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 28 May 04. “On 28 Jan 04, Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Peter Schoomaker, testified he had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense to increase the end strength of the Army by 30,000 personnel on a temporary basis. He argued that a permanent increase would create a burden on planned defense budgets in out years, citing \$1.2 Billion annually for each increase of 10,000 troops. Some ongoing programs were presented as, over time, providing a more efficient and usable force structure within current Army end strength.

there has been simply no alternative to drawing on infantry for the bulk of the force. Other units—engineers,aviation,artillery—can provide support in regular operations where appropriate, or with proper training they can substitute for infantry. Furthermore, in bare-base regions, the logistics support forces requirement will be substantial.”²² Therefore, a review of Army doctrine as it applies to SO and CSO is useful to show that the Army understands this dilemma but recognizes that specializing will not solve this problem.

²² Quinlivan, James T. *Force Requirements in Stability Operations*, Parameters, Winter 1995, p65.

THE ARNG IN STABILITY AND CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“Finally, the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”²³

“Finally, while maintaining near-term readiness and the ability to fight the war on terrorism, the goal must be to provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage aggression or any form of coercion against the United States, our allies, and our friends.”²⁴



Figure 1 – Full Spectrum Operations²⁵

Inherent to understanding the flaws in having separate force structure for specific mission sets is that operations occur across a spectrum of effort. Figure 1 graphically represents that concept of Full Spectrum Operations. Any operation that the U.S. asks the Army to conduct now requires operating simultaneously across this spectrum. As the President outlined in his National Security Strategy of 2002, the opportunity to extend the benefit of freedom will require an Army

²³ White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C., 17 Sep 2002, p 2.

²⁴ White House. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C.: White House, 17 Sep 2002, pp 30.

²⁵ Crisco, LTC Telford, *The Modular Force*, Briefing to SAMS Class, 24 Mar 05, Slide 39.

that transforms to conduct full spectrum operations to stabilize weak or failed nations. Inherent in this belief is the idea that the United States and her coalition partners will have to conduct stability operations to realize this strategy. However, in order for SO to be successful, it requires extensive amounts of time, money and personnel. A recent RAND study indicates these factors, “Successful nation-building, as this study illustrates, needs time and resources.”²⁶ “Several factors influence the ease or difficulty of nation building: prior democratic experience, level of economic development and national homogeneity. However, among controllable factors, the most important determinant is the level of effort – measured in time, manpower, and money.”²⁷ As operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, SO requires a concerted effort, for a lengthy period, in order to accomplish the goals recently expressed by the Administration. Because these operations have required large numbers of troops, over an extended period, the use of the ARNG has become necessary. The ARNG has been conducting the Army mission and operations in Bosnia and Kosovo for over five years now. Several ARNG Division HQs conducted these SO, with the mission in Kosovo scheduled to end this year. The use of ARNG CBT A and not just CBT S and CBT SS assets has become the norm. Add in that almost every ARNG eSB has rotated through Iraq or Afghanistan since those operations began and for all practical purposes, the ARNG has become the operational equivalent of the AC.

What criticism there has been of the US Military is that, while extremely adept at conducting large scale and combined arms operations, the US Military lacks the experience and skills required of a post-conflict environment. The US Military, the prevailing wisdom goes, is too reliant on technology overmatch and combat skills in solving what are complex, long-term problems that require “non-kinetic” solutions and problem solving skills. The Army and by extension the ARNG run into problems in SO when they attempt to match expectations with

²⁶ Dobbins, James, et. al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003, pp XXV

²⁷ Ibid.

reality. While acknowledging the length of time and effort required for SO-the US also falls into patterns of behavior that are not conducive to these long-term operations and goals. The tendency of the U.S. Government is to set goals too general in stability operations, which are very difficult to articulate into action. This leads the U.S. Military and especially the Army into repair service behavior²⁸. For example, because promoting democracy and establishing security are such large goals and most Army staffs rarely understand how to reach these goals, the Army reverts to what it knows and conducts tactical combined arms operations that do little towards solving stability conundrums. One of the simpler solutions it seems would be to have a separate military organization that deals specifically with this complex problem of nation building. Why not organize and equip the ARNG, by logical extension, to conduct these missions? The ARNG would be equipped with CS and CSS assets and only called out when needed for the post conflict period after a major ground invasion. The idea goes further in that this “support heavy” organization would also better suit them for CSO in the Homeland Defense mission.

However, SO raise an important issue as it relates to creating a separate stability or constabulary organization. Missions and tasks related to SO and CSO have a correlation to how the ARNG operates at the tactical unit and individual level during the course of “normal” operations. Therefore creating an organization based on tactical tasks is not necessary in order to accomplish operational and strategic missions. The Army already acknowledges in doctrine that SO and CSO are critical missions. FM 3-07 states: “Stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis (FM 3-0). Army forces accomplish stability goals through engagement and response. The military activities that support stability operations are diverse, continuous, and often long-term. Their purpose is to promote and sustain regional and

²⁸ Dorner, Dietrich. *The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Failure in Complex Situations*, Cambridge Mass, Perseus Books, 1989, p 58.

global stability.”²⁹ “Support operations employ Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crisis and relieve suffering (FM 3-0). The primary role of support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups, for a limited time, until civil authorities can accomplish these tasks without military assistance. Support operations also have two subordinate types: domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance.”³⁰ Further, the Total Army provides capabilities that are unmatched in the conduct of all operations and this is what a Modular Army can bring vice a specialized force structure.

Using the concepts of flexibility, feasibility, sustainability and survivability for a modular organization does as well or better than specialized structures. Certain capabilities stand out in the conduct of stability operations and support operations. Among them is the current Army structure, and even more so with Modularity, the ability to:

Task-organize to tailor the force rapidly to meet varying requirements. Army forces can communicate locally, regionally, and globally. Unity of command allows pursuit of assigned objectives as a united team.

Deploy or be employed anywhere in nearly any environment and operate in austere and undeveloped areas.

Use logistic systems to facilitate sustainment capability across the spectrum of conflict. Army forces are suited to react quickly when called to provide logistic support for domestic and foreign, natural, or man-made disasters. Strategic deployment requires both air and sea lines of communications, while the Army maintains the structure and expertise to develop, acquire, and supply the equipment and supplies for conducting full spectrum operations on land.

Control terrain and influence the population in the area of operations to ensure freedom of action. Soldiers have the inherent capability to protect themselves and the ability to protect others, if necessary.³¹

The remainder of this chapter explores further the capabilities and inherent understanding in Army doctrine of SO and CSO. Reviewing unit and individual tactical tasks in SO and CSO provides an even deeper understanding of why an organization should not be specialized for these missions.

²⁹ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. p 1-2.

³⁰ Ibid. p 1-2.

³¹ Ibid, para 1-45, p 1-12 to 1-13.

Stability Operations Tactical Tasks

Unit Tactical Tasks in SO

The definitions of what tactical tasks and individual tasks are offered at this point. “A tactical mission task is a specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either action by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force.”³² These are tasks, performed by a unit generally at division and below, and will be at brigade and below in Modularity. When researching this question it became apparent that comparing all the tasks across the spectrum of operations was not the crux of the issue. Different groups of Army professionals (TF Modularity, TF Soldier) did this analysis already and this did not reveal anything fundamentally new towards this force structure argument. “According to the “Stability and Support Operations Study Results,” 22 May 2002, about 80 percent of conventional Mission Training Plan (MTP) tasks is relevant in stability and support operations.”³³ What is relevant here, however, is that the Army already addresses the issue of unit and individual tasks in doctrine, doctrine that is borne of experience in conducting these missions. FM 3-07 acknowledges that what is required in war fighting also relates to operating in SO and CSO.

War fighting skills developed and honed in training form the basis for mission success. Combat-ready units can adapt readily to noncombat situations, but units not trained to standard cannot survive in combat. The knowledge, discipline, cohesion, and technical skills necessary to defeat an enemy are also needed in environments that seem far removed from the battlefield. The combat capability of Army forces is the basis for all they do. In stability operations, the threat of force may deter escalation; in a support operation, it may preempt violence and lawlessness.³⁴

What has become of paramount importance is the priority of tasks that units must train upon, and not so much having a separate force structure, as revealed in an interview with MG

³² Department of the Army, *The Army Universal Task List*, FM 7-15, Aug 2003, p 8-1.

³³ Department of Defense, *Stability and Support Operations Study Results*, 22 May 2002.

³⁴ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. para 2-80.

Wofford, Deputy Commander of Forces Command. “What the ARNG needs is the priority of what are the Mission Essential Tasks to train on prior to conducting an operation, regardless of what that operation may be: Combat, SO or CSO.”³⁵ MG Chiarelli, then of the First Cavalry Division, echoes this belief, “Our strategic environment has forever changed. It demands a realignment of the critical tasks needed to be successful as a military force. Those critical tasks must be matched to how we execute the tools of national power from a structural and cultural perspective...The move toward modularity is of prime importance to the future of our force, yet advocating radical surgery to mission requirements might not be the optimal solution. The 1st Cavalry Division was able to rapidly make the change from a traditional armored force and focus quickly on a new environment because of the adaptability of soldiers and leaders who had developed the necessary leader skills and team comfort based on training fewer, rather than more, training tasks.”³⁶

FM 3-07 provides the understanding of the importance of METL in SO:

The mission essential task list (METL) development process remains the link between anticipated stability operations and support operations missions and predeployment training (see FM 7-0 and FM 7-1). In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence belligerent actions. The combat tasks, tactics, techniques, and procedures used in offensive and defensive operations are the same as those employed in stability operations. Peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, foreign internal defense, and show of force are some examples of stability operations where forces may be required to conduct combat tasks. However, the conditions and standards of performance for these tasks are modified by METT-TC considerations and the more restrictive ROE required in stability operations. Commanders use basic tactical concepts and control measures for offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations. (See FM 3-90.)³⁷

Another way of looking at this issue revolves around the number of tactical tasks a unit must be prepared to conduct. Granted some specialized units conduct some of these missions (i.e. Special Forces conducting Foreign Internal Defense) but there is enough variance in the unit tasks

³⁵ Wofford, MG William, Deputy CG, FORSCOM, *Personal Interview*, 30 Nov 05.

³⁶ Chiarelli, MG Peter W. and MAJ Patrick R. Michaelis, *Winning the Peace, The Requirement of Full-Spectrum Operations*, Military Review, July-August 2005, p 16.

³⁷ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. para 2-81.

that creating separate units for each seems dubious at best. Looking at Figure 3 from FM 7-15 of The Army Universal Task List, there are ten tasks that the Army must be prepared to conduct in SO; and reading further in the field manual shows that there are 25 subtasks under the ten shown.




Figure 2 - Stability Operations Tactical Tasks³⁸

Creating a unit specifically for SO then just is not consistent with Army tactical unit tasks as specified in doctrine. Doctrine relies on the historical realities and practice that best fit the Army's mode of operation." but the Somalia case raises concerns about the "separate SASO force" idea, since the Army units organized to handle Somalia and Bosnia made extensive use of Army components needed for conventional war. Creating a wholly separate set of SASO

³⁸ Department of the Army, *The Army Universal Task List*, FM 7-15, Aug 2003, p 8-12.

capabilities thus would be wastefully redundant and probably unaffordable. In this sense, the work summarized here supports the Army's current effort to ready all units to handle the "full spectrum" of potential operations."³⁹

Individual Tasks in SO

Individual tasks are those that relate to the "warrior tasks" and "battle drills" enumerated by Task Force Soldier, that the CSA considers relevant for the COE. "GEN Schoomaker wanted to focus the Army's efforts on winning the Global War on Terrorism and ensure that training is relevant and Soldiers are prepared for combat."⁴⁰ All Soldiers regardless of rank or MOS must perform these tasks. It further relates to the individual tasks a soldier must perform in his or her Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Inverse to the myriad of tactical unit tasks that must be conducted in SO, individual soldier tasks and skills transfer, for the most part, across the spectrum of operations. The individual tasks and skills a soldier trains on, commonly referred to as Common Training Tasks (CTT), ready the individual to operate in any environment. Another concept is that if the unit is task organized properly, the individual soldier will be conducting their MOS skill regardless of the environment. For example, an Intelligence Analyst will gather intelligence in accordance with their training and tailor it for the mission, regardless of what it is they are gathering.

While opponents will argue that SO diminish the war-fighter's primary MOS and combat skills, the ARNG has and will continue to stress that the type of operation does not degrade the individual skills of the soldier. Most ARNG soldiers mobilized in SO are specifically for establishing security in an austere environment, directly calling upon their individual warrior

³⁹ McNaughter, Thomas. et. al., *Agility by a Different Measure, Creating a More Flexible U.S. Army*, <http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP195>, 30 Nov 2005, Ibid. p 5.

⁴⁰ Fournier, Annette. Warrior Tasks, Battle Drills Designed, Refined to Produce Battle-Ready Soldiers in all Components regardless of Rank, MOS. Fort Benning, GA: The Bayonet, TRADOC News Service, 5 Nov 2004.

skills. “Many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a good soldier. In part this argument is based on the growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the continued use of force and that the most credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat.”⁴¹

Other critics argue that repeated mobilizations for SO create animosity among ARNG soldiers and this leads to them getting out. While true for some, the percentage is much lower than is often stated. If anything, the operational and expeditionary mindset has changed how many ARNG soldiers view their duties. “The planning required to conduct these global missions, along with the cross-leveling of knowledge and culture from the active component brought about an increase in technical and tactical skill sets and professionalism of the ARNG...this in turn led to the growth of an operational mind-set that began to flourish around the turn of the (21st) century”⁴² “The very real prospect of deploying into an austere, physically demanding, and threatening environment on a regular basis, even every five to six years, has sparked a dramatic shift in the demographics, motivation and level of commitment of those that are joining and choosing to remain in the Guard.”⁴³ Soldiers and units train SO missions and tasks regularly given their primacy in current operations. Given the opportunity to train these tasks, ARNG soldiers are proving effective in practicing these skills overseas.

Civil Support Tactical Tasks

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were devastating to the Gulf Coast Region and showed many “seams” from local, to state, to federal in the response to a large-scale disaster. Lost in much of

⁴¹ Serafino, Nina M., *Peacekeeping, Issues of U.S. Military Involvement*, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 25 Aug 2000, p CRS-8.

⁴² Adrian, Anthony. *The National Guard in the Expeditionary Army: Cultural Implications of Increased Frequency of Deployment on the Army National Guard*, FT Leavenworth, KS: MMAS Monograph, 2005, pp 55.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p 66.

the clamor over the rescue effort were the ARNG and their historic response. Thirty thousand ARNG soldiers deployed to the scene within five days of the levees failing. By September 10, over fifty thousand troops from the 54 states and territories had deployed in support of the relief effort. “In Louisiana and Mississippi alone, Guardsmen saved more than 11,130 lives, including 4,200 in New Orleans. They also assisted in evacuating 70,000 people stranded in the now infamous Superdome and the New Orleans Convention Center and helped more than 100,000 others throughout Louisiana. In the four weeks after Katrina struck, Guardsmen provided 8.2 million Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), 6.5 million gallons of water and 49 million pounds of ice to people in Louisiana and Mississippi. Over the same period, they also cleared debris off at least 4,000 miles of roadways and helped the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers install temporary roofs on 10,000 homes in Mississippi alone and repaired the breached levees in New Orleans.”⁴⁴

Politicians and media wondered aloud why the response was not better coordinated and that is beyond the purview of this paper.

What is of concern, however, is the claim that the ARNG should be “kept at home” and made into a “Homeland Defense” Force. As if this would solve the political and legal issues of how the ARNG supports civil authorities. Once again, the repair service behavior of policy makers seems to be towards changing the ARNG as it relates to solving the issue of immediate response to a large-scale disaster. One of the anecdotal stories to come from Katrina was the 256th eSB of the Louisiana ARNG. In the midst of redeploying from Iraq, many of the soldiers from this unit had personal property destroyed by the storm. Many questioned why they were not at home to be able to respond to this kind of emergency. However, had they been at home they likely would have been the victims of the storm themselves and unable to respond any quicker than the response that was provided.

⁴⁴ Goheen, John. *Historic Response*, National Guard Magazine, Volume 59, Number 10, National Guard Association of the United States, Wash, D.C., Oct 2005, pp 26.

The issue is not how the ARNG is structured or responds to these crises, as detailed above, the response by the ARNG was as rapid and thorough as could reasonably be expected in the aftermath of an incident of this size. The issues in immediate response go much deeper and beyond the scope of this paper, but for the most part does not relate to how the ARNG is structured or responds. However, as devastating as these hurricanes were, and as large as the ARNG response was, disaster relief is one of only several missions that the ARNG conducts on a regular basis in CSO. A cursory glance at the ARNG Homepage reveals a myriad of operations the Guard is involved in domestically, from fighting wildfires to assisting in ice storm recovery. All of this is occurring while record numbers of ARNG soldiers deploy across the globe in support of the GWOT. While this has placed a strain on the organization and caused hardship for some ARNG soldiers, it is still what the ARNG has and will continue to do as an organization whose primary mission is training to go to war.

Unit Tactical Tasks in CSO

As with SO, it is useful to look at tasks in CSO in a similar manner. This further understanding as to why a full spectrum force is better than one developed for specific roles. “Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 states: The SECDEF shall provide MSCA for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The SECDEF shall retain command and control of military forces providing civil support. The SECDEF and Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the two departments.”⁴⁵ Similar to SO, CSO can cover a wide range of contingencies, which the ARNG does on a regular basis. As stated in FM 3-07:

⁴⁵ Bowman, Steve and Lawrence Kapp. *Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response*. Washington D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 19 Sep 2005, p CRS-13.

Although Army forces are not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations, their war fighting capabilities are particularly suited to domestic support operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. Units trained for their wartime mission are disciplined with well-established, flexible, and adaptable procedures. Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-equipped organizations. They can operate and sustain themselves in austere environments with organic assets. They can move large forces to the affected area with organic transportation.⁴⁶

As in SO, CSO requires a set of capabilities from the ARNG and not a specific force structure. There are too many separate missions for the ARNG to specialize their tactical force structure, the bulk of their labor, to accomplish each one. As the chart below illustrates, there is a responsibility under Homeland Defense to guard the nation and the also a responsibility to support civil authorities across a broad spectrum of missions.



Figure 3 - Civil Support Missions⁴⁷

A sampling of the types of tasks permitted just under disaster relief, a mission under Military Support to Civil Authorities, further under Military Assistance to Civil Authorities reveals how myriad the tasks become for each situation. “Debris removal and road clearance, search and rescue, emergency medical care and shelter, provision of food, water and other essential needs, dissemination of public information, and assistance regarding health and safety

⁴⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. para 2-82.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense. *Homeland Security*, JP 3-26, 2 Aug 2005, Fig I-6.

measures and the provision of technical advice to state and local governments on disaster management and control.”⁴⁸ FM 100-19, Domestic Support Operations, provides a succinct view of the military’s, and by extension, the ARNG’s support to domestic operations:

The military’s role is well defined and by law is limited in scope and duration. Military resources temporarily support and augment—they do not replace—the local, state, and federal civilian agencies that have primary authority and responsibility for domestic disaster assistance.

The military does not stockpile resources solely for domestic disaster assistance. Disaster planning and coordination must occur between the appropriate agencies at the appropriate levels, for example, between DOMS and FEMA, between CINCs and CONUSA, between the federal, state, and regional agencies.⁴⁹

The Army’s structure and training in command and control, deployability, and sustainment operations offer ready and robust capabilities for disaster assistance support. Those same skills that soldiers and leaders use day to day often translate to the types of tasks required during disasters. While conceding that the likelihood of each scenario occurring is across the spectrum, from unlikely (major foreign invasion) to a fairly, constant event (natural disasters), the same skills will be needed regardless of the event. Senator Nunn recognized this in front of the Senate on 23 Jun 1992, “as we restructure our Armed Forces over the next decade, the attention of DOD’s civilian and military leadership must remain focused on training the Armed Forces for their primary mission, which is the military mission. That goal, in my view, is compatible with enhancing the military’s ability to assist in meeting domestic needs.”⁵⁰ The complexity of trying to build a force structure, based on CSO, again just seems imprudent.

⁴⁸ Elsea, Jennifer K. *The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues*. Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress, 16 Sep 2005, p CRS-3.

⁴⁹ Department of the Army, *Domestic Support Operations*, FM 100-19, Jul 1993.

⁵⁰ Schrader, John. *The Army’s Role in Domestic Disaster Support: An Assessment of Policy Choices*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993.

Individual Tasks in CSO

Similar to the myriad of tactical unit tasks that must be conducted in SO, individual soldier tasks and skills transfer, for the most part, to CSO as well. Again, FM 3-07 reiterates the doctrinal understanding of this concept:

Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations. Support operations often require the accomplishment of combat tasks. For example, a scout platoon establishes observation posts in support of counterdrug operations or combat engineers reducing obstacles after a natural disaster. Some missions require specialized training such as that provided by the National Interagency Fire Center to train soldiers in fighting forest fires. Many combat service support missions and tasks are the same across the entire spectrum of operations.⁵¹

What is unique to the ARNG, as it relates to individual tasks in CSO, is the concept of “dual status” as it relates to supporting local and state law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act cleaved the AC and the ARNG in an important way. This act established in law the long-standing tradition of keeping the military under the control of civilian leaders. Borne of post Civil War troubles by having Army units perform law enforcement, this act specifically forbids the Active Army from acting domestically to perform law enforcement functions. However, the ARNG is still able to mobilize under the control of state governors. Under this status, referred to as Title 32, it authorizes the use of ARNG for law enforcement functions, giving Governors and State Adjutant Generals amazing flexibility during a domestic incident. The National Guard can therefore fulfill two distinct functions where the Active Army can generally only fill one in domestic situations. While the President has the authority to call out the AC to perform law enforcement functions, it requires rare situations that come with considerable political risk: Marshal Law, Domestic Insurrections, etc.

Why this is important in the context of this argument again goes to the flexibility afforded by a modular organization operating across the spectrum of domestic missions. A specialized unit would not be able to “plug and play” into a modular organization as easily and

⁵¹ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. para 2-83.

would not provide capability or capacity across a spectrum of tasks. If a unit is specialized, then their specialization provides little flexibility because of their equipment and training. A modular ARNG, however, can have individuals operate across the spectrum, in different statuses, as the situation requires. This gives civilian leaders and military commanders many more options to react to problems as they arise in an austere environment. An infantry company can act as law enforcement, search and rescue, and other assorted tasks, controlling an area by the nature of their organization better than a constabulary or stability unit does. Therefore cleaving the force structure based on specific mission requirements cleaves the capability to operate across the spectrum of tasks that may be required. Especially if any of these specialized units are overseas, for extended periods, conducting stability operations. If less BCTs are available in the Total Force, then the synergy of a combined arms formation is lost in reacting to domestic concerns. The synergy a brigade combat team brings with its inherent flexibility, sustainability and survivability.

Since the ARNG, by proxy, has become the operational equivalent of the Regular Army, and the inclusion of the ARNG in future SO is required to support this idea, this leads to the question of how the ARNG should organize for the future? As illustrated in the introduction there are several who would organize specific units to conduct these missions. “Further, wherever possible we have sought to maintain unity of our institutional arrangements underpinning combat operations and stability operations. The line between the two is often not clear and constantly shifting, and further we cannot afford to maintain two separate forces, one dedicated to major combat, the other to stability operations.”⁵² For all the reasons listed in the first two chapters, a specialized structure does not seem prudent. Therefore, does the ARNG Transformation structure provide the necessary capability to operate across the spectrum of operations?

⁵² Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD, September 2005, pp. 3.

THE ARNG TRANSFORMATION PLAN

“We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support preemptive options, we will: ...continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.”⁵³

“A military structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.”⁵⁴

“The National Military Strategy directs a force sized to defend the homeland, deter forward in and from four regions, and conduct two, overlapping “swift defeat” campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the force must be able to “win decisively” in one of the two campaigns. This “1-4-2-1” force-sizing construct places a premium of increasingly innovative and efficient methods to achieve objectives. The construct establishes mission parameters for the most demanding set of potential scenarios and encompasses the full range of military operations.”⁵⁵ The NMS construct is ambitious but necessary in framing why the force must transform to operate in the current environment. The ARNG is a large part of this construct as their posture to operate across the spectrum is necessary. Since 9/11, the ARNG has responded across the spectrum of operations in support of the Homeland and the Army abroad.

In this chapter, discussion turns to the ARNG transformation plan, which is in three parts: first, the concept of Modularity and the subsequent transformation of ARNG combat formations, second, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and third, the AC/RC Rebalance Initiative. The Active Army and the ARNG believe that by completing these three concepts they will get at the core issue raised by civilian leadership and critics; that issue being the readiness of the ARNG to operate effectively across the spectrum of operations. While not the perfect solution these three concepts best address the future national defense needs.

⁵³ Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C.: White House, 17 Sep 2002, p 16.

⁵⁴ Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, D.C.: White House, 17 Sep 2002, pp 29.

⁵⁵ Department of Defense. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004, p 21.

ARNG Modularity

“The issue then is how to imbue the Army’s structure – and by extension its doctrine and training – with sufficient flexibility so that it can respond with agility to any and all demands. And it must do so without compromising its formidable capability to prosecute conventional war, its foremost mission.”⁵⁶ The ARNG is currently transforming from 10 Divisions and 42 Brigades to 8 Divisions and 34 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to align with AC Modularity.

In the current plan, all eight Army National Guard divisional headquarters will convert to the new modular division design; all Army National Guard separate and divisional brigades will convert to 23 Infantry BCTs, 10 Heavy BCTs and one Stryker BCT (34 total); and a number of other formations will convert to various modular supporting units: six fires brigades, 10 combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement), 11 sustainment brigades, eight combat aviation brigades (from the former divisional aviation brigades), four aviation brigades, one aviation command and one aviation group.⁵⁷

The force structure change focuses at the brigade as the primary tactical formation as opposed to the division. This is significant because it codifies in doctrine, training and ultimately resourcing how the Army operates in current operations and will in the future. The Army has moved more and more towards Brigade size task forces and away from the division in deploying units. The paragraph below details the types of brigades that will be available in Modularity and Figure 4 provides the ARNG units converting to meet the FY2010 goal for Transformation.

The three designs include a heavy brigade with two armor-mechanized infantry battalions and an armed reconnaissance battalion; an infantry brigade with two infantry battalions and an armed reconnaissance and surveillance battalion; and a Stryker brigade with three Stryker battalions and a reconnaissance and surveillance battalion. Four of the five types of support brigades perform a single function each: aviation; fires; sustain; and battlefield surveillance. The fifth, maneuver enhancement brigade, is organized around a versatile core of supporting units that provide engineer, military police, air defense, chemical and signal capabilities. Modularity increases each unit’s capability by building in the communications, liaison and logistics capabilities needed to permit greater operational autonomy and support the ability to conduct joint, multinational operations. These capabilities have previously been resident at much higher organizational echelons.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ McNaughter, Thomas. et. al., *Agility by a Different Measure, Creating a More Flexible U.S. Army*, <http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP195>, 30 Nov 2005, p 1.

⁵⁷ AUSA, *Army National Guard Division and Brigade Combat Team Designations*, Torchbearer Special Report, Wash D.C., Dec 2005.

⁵⁸ Department of the Army, *Army Posture Statement 2005*, Wash D.C, p 8.

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MANEUVER FORCE MODULAR CONVERSION									
Division (UEX)	FY05			FY06			FY07		
Brigade (UA)									
	30 HVY	81 HVY	39 IN	116 HVY	256 HVY	278 ACR (HVY)	56 IN	155 HVY	29 IN
	FY08			FY09			FY10		
	41 IN	218 HVY	1 HVY	49 IN	1 IN	149 IN	56 SBCT	50 IN	45 IN
	92 IN	2 IN	37 IN	2 IN	55 HVY	3 IN	26 IN	3 IN	66 IN
	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN	207 IN

Figure 4 - ARNG Modularity Conversion⁵⁹

Critics claim the plan for Modularity weakens combat power by changing the structure without adding end-strength. “The essence of land power is resident in the maneuver battalions that occupy terrain, control populations and fight battles, not in headquarters and enablers. Yet the Army plan reduces the number of maneuver battalions by 20 percent below the number available in 2003, while increasing BCT headquarters by 11.5 percent”⁶⁰ However, the headquarters and enablers are exactly what the ARNG needs to operate effectively across the spectrum of operations. Almost everyone agrees that, for the near-term, no adversary is going to oppose the U.S. Army in a large force on force engagement. “The Operational Assessments in August and September generally confirmed that the modular force were robust across the spectrum of operations. The UEy and UEx organizations provided a flexible construct for Combatant Commanders. The modular organizations employed provided inherent flexibility, regardless of the type of operation. The assessments illustrated that there was additional work required to clearly delineate roles, relationships and responsibilities of these organizations.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*, Wash D.C., Jul 2004, p 40.

⁶⁰ Grossman, Elaine M. *Study Finds Army Transformation Plan Weakens Combat Capability*. Washington, D.C.: Inside the Pentagon, 26 Jan 2006, pp 1.

⁶¹ Department of the Army, *TF Modularity: The Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force*, TRAC Analysis Center, FT Leavenworth, KS, 1 Jul 2005, p 52.

Further, the robust command and control capability that is pushed to lower echelons will provide an enhanced ability for states that experience a disaster. The additional communication and support vehicles created by the additional structure being pushed to lower echelons will provide a greater span of control and haul capacity that are needed in disaster areas. The flexibility offered by the reorganization of forces allows the ARNG to operate across the spectrum of operations.

Army Force Generation

Concurrent with the move to modular organizations is the Total Army concept of Force Generation, commonly referred to as ARFORGEN. Essentially, it moves the ARNG from the Cold War construct of a tiered readiness posture based on mobilizing personnel to fill “empty” force structure to a cyclic readiness posture as indicated in Figure 5.



Figure 5 - ARNG Force Generation Model⁶²

⁶² Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*, Wash D.C., Jul 2004, p 51.

An ARNG Brigade will now be available for deployment every six years as opposed to being called “as needed” in the previous construct. This will foster stability for units and states, as a unit will know when they are eligible for mobilization to an expeditionary mission. This allows ARNG units to focus their METL for each training year in a more consistent manner with possible contingencies they may face, foreign or domestic. This further enhances the capability for domestic operations as well, because it allows for sourcing an available unit against domestic contingency plans and allows local and state officials to know what assets they can expect in support for a disaster.

AC/RC Rebalancing Initiative

The ARNG is also rebalancing the remaining CBT A, CBT S and CBT SS structure to align with the BCT structure as part of another SECDEF initiative. This rebalancing will move the USARNG from an approximately 52% CBT A and 35% CBT S and CBT SS structure now to approximately 38% CBT A and 50% CBT S and CBT SS by the year 2011.⁶³ The rebalancing is proceeding, for the most part, without losing any force structure that personnel currently occupy. Figure 6 below is a good graphic representation of the AC/RC Rebalance Initiative. This initiative goes towards addressing the concerns that the Army needs to “create” more of the CBT S and CBT SS assets required in operating domestically and sustaining operational commitments abroad. This initiative allows the ARNG to divest itself of “empty” force structure and simultaneously increase the needed capabilities offered by the units listed. It also allows the AC more flexibility by creating force packages for initial entry without having to rely on reserve component assets immediately. The balance created further allows for flexibility and a tailored response for domestic missions.

⁶³ Beltran, Ricky, Colonel. Chief, Modular Coordination Cell, National Guard Bureau, *Personal Interview*, 14 Nov 2005.




Figure 6 - AC/RC Rebalance Initiative⁶⁴

There are critics who believe that this initiative should go further. Those who agree with the Hart-Rudmann Commission in principle would have all CBT A force structure removed from the ARNG. The ARNG would in essence acquire the same structure as the Army Reserve. The idea being that the ARNG would serendipitously have CBT S and CBT SS structure for CSO as well as the capability to support the Army for overseas contingencies. The request for this capability, theoretically, would then only be as a last resort for operations overseas. This idea suffers from two poor assumptions.

⁶⁴ Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*, Wash D.C., Jul 2004, p 56.

The first poor assumption is that by losing CBT A structure the ARNG would somehow become less necessary for overseas mobilizations. However, recent operations have shown this to be false and if anything, Reserve CBT S and CBT SS are generally the first units requested for overseas contingencies. Army planners call all force structure as needed and ARNG CBT A units historically are the last units called for mobilization. Recent events have shown that a balance of force structure across the Total Army is necessary to plan and sustain all operations.

The second poor assumption is that CBT A force structure is somehow not capable or optimized for SO and CSO. As pointed out in Chapter 3, the imbedded capability of CBT A structure is as necessary as any of the CBT S or CBT SS structure for SO and CSO. CBT A force structure has a distinct capability to long haul provisions; provide wheeled vehicles for urban operations; use internal, robust communications and operate for long durations in an austere environment. CBT A is necessary for it allows the Total Army to have combat equipment maintained to the same readiness standards across the board, with relatively well-trained personnel at a fraction of the personnel costs. Pushing all the CBT A into the AC is not sound from a resource management standpoint. It further ignores the historical role the ARNG has played in providing CBT A capability for over three hundred years.

While the ARNG is currently conducting operations and undertaking Transformation successfully, it has come at a considerable strain on personnel and equipment. Most experts agree there are serious concerns about the use of and replacement of ARNG equipment in order to continue operations at the current pace and still transform. However, the current plan for transformation does a fair bit to address these concerns *if implemented according to plan*. That in order to realize this capability does not mean creating or changing the ARNG for specific missions, rather the planning and resource allowance for these missions is what must change. As laid out in the previous chapter, specialized formations do not provide the flexibility, sustainability and survivability of a full spectrum force. Rather, the importance of planning for

domestic operations, as the equivalent of foreign operations, goes more towards giving the ARNG the ability to respond to domestic operations.

As shown in the previous chapter, there are a myriad of tactical tasks, and that *detailed* prior planning of operations in support of these tasks leading to prioritization of unit METL does more to prepare the ARNG in responding to domestic support than creating separate formations. Further, since the ARNG is the operational equivalent of the AC, the resources provided for the ARNG has to change if this Transformation is going to be effective. If domestic planning and resource deficiencies are to blame for the ARNG problems in the current operating environment, then what is the cause?

HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS FOR AC/ARNG ISSUES

In order to understand the ARNG and the current dilemma with the AC requires reviewing the key historical legal and policy decisions that are the proximate cause of these issues. Specifically, the importance of the legislation known as the Dick Act and the policy change known as the Total Army concept. The Dick Act was the major catalyst for binding the AC and the ARNG throughout the 20th Century. It was successful in allowing the ARNG to be a strategic reserve and simultaneously a domestic responder. The Total Army concept was the policy decision to push the majority of CBT S and CBT SS into the reserves after the Vietnam War. This policy would force future administrations to mobilize reservists for almost any contingency, ensuring “hometown” support for deployments.

The Spanish-American War became the significant event that would spur policy makers into action and ultimately led to the creation of the Dick Act. “America’s mobilization for the Spanish-American War demonstrated that both the Regular Army and the ARNG were unprepared for modern warfare.”⁶⁵ The landmark legislation that would come from this was the Militia Act of 1903, commonly referred to as the Dick Act after Major General Charles W. Dick, commander of the Ohio Guard and a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. He worked with Secretary of War, Elihu Root, and hammered out the compromise that would create for all intents and purposed the ARNG as it exists today.

The 1903 Militia (Dick) Act, which replaced the old Militia Act of 1792, divided all male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 into the organized militia (National Guard) and the reserve militia. In addition, it mandated that, within five years, the organization, pay, discipline and equipment of the National Guard is the same as that of the Regular Army. Increased federal funding would compensate Guardsmen for summer training camps and joint maneuvers with the Regular Army. States were required to hold at least 24 drills (instructional periods) each year, and some National Guard officers could now attend Regular Army schools. The War Department assigned Regular Army officers to each state as advisors, instructors and inspectors and enabled states to exchange outdated weapons and equipment for current issue. The War Department also

⁶⁵ *Army National Guard History*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng-history.htm>

created the Division of Militia Affairs, the forerunner of the National Guard Bureau, to oversee National Guard organization and training.⁶⁶

The Militia Act of 1903 had constraints, however, in that Guardsmen could only serve nine months of service and could only do their federal service within the Continental United States (CONUS). The President also still had to ask permission of the Governors before he could mobilize a unit. Another Militia Act passed in 1908, essentially an extension of the 1903 Act, would make two key changes, it provided no limits on time or area of service. The Dick Act proved to be landmark legislation in that it almost doubled the “force structure” ability of the Regular Army when the National Guard mobilized. The ARNG was provided similar equipment and training that created a “level playing field”. The act would create a more professional ARNG by the start of WW I in codifying already existing practices and use of the National Guard. This act would also establish the practice of “calling up” the ARNG, for any national contingency that required the mobilization of a large number of units and troops, which still exists to this day.

However, understanding the AC and ARNG relationship that was borne of this legislation requires understanding how this created a dual role for the ARNG. The majority of funding for the ARNG comes from equipment based on the organization of the ARNG for its federal mission. This federal mission is to train to Army standards and be prepared as a reserve to mobilize and deploy with the AC. The majority of training dollars comes from training for the federal mission under one of the Active Army’s exercises. Therefore, huge savings are realized when the ARNG is funded for one mission with the Regular Army and is still able to support domestic contingencies. The first real test for the National Guard under this new system came when 158,000 Guardsmen were called up to patrol the Mexican Border during the border crisis of 1916. 10,000 Guardsmen failed their physicals and sundry other problems were noted, which led to another act being passed. “The National Defense Act of 1916 provided increased federal support and regulation; when officers and units reached Army standards in regard to strength, equipment

⁶⁶ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng-history.htm>

and skill, they were federally recognized and eligible for federal support.”⁶⁷ 379,000 Guardsmen would be “called up” a year later for federal service in WW I, the National Guard supplied 17 combat divisions (roughly 40 percent of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF))⁶⁸, and performed as well as the regular Army in turning the tide of that war.

Subsequent legislation would further codify the role of the National Guard as a part of the federal force. “The National Defense Act of 1920 established the Army of the United States, to consist of the Regular Army, the Organized Reserve Corps and the National Guard, when called into federal service.”⁶⁹ “An amendment to the National Defense Act passed on June 15, 1933 created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States. This component, while identical in personnel and organization to the National Guard of the states, was a part of the Army at all times, and could be ordered into active federal service by the president whenever Congress declared a national emergency. Thus it became possible for the National Guard to be given an Army mission without having to wait for a “call” to be issued by the various state governors.”⁷⁰ This further codified existing practices and norms and proved to be effective in fighting World War II and the conflict in Korea. The National Guard was able to provide trained and ready units that performed as the system intended. Divisional units, not individual replacements, were in both WW II theaters and Korea, allowing the coalition efforts in those conflicts to be sustainable. While not legislative in nature, the National Guard had its “dual status” codified in policy as approved in plans by the Secretary of War on October 13, 1945. This dual status has been a part of ARNG policy and practice for the last sixty years. As a reserve component of the Army, the ARNG would become a Mobilization Day (M-Day) force in case of federal emergencies or contingencies. As the same organization, the National Guard provides the ability to “preserve

⁶⁷ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng-history.htm>

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

peace, order and public safety in their respective states and during local emergencies.”⁷¹ Whether it was total victory or a negotiated cease-fire, the ARNG proved to be invaluable.

The next major change for the ARNG would be a policy change in the Army force structure known as the “Total Force Concept.” The National Guard as an organization had a very limited role during the Vietnam War. This was due to political decisions made by President Lyndon Johnson and was not a reflection of the National Guard’s ability to perform as an organization if called upon. The ARNG stayed busy, however, as they assisted civil authorities in stabilizing many of the larger American cities during separate periods of civil disobedience. The Vietnam War would prove to be politically volatile and lead to decisions that would fundamentally change the USARNG. The “Total Force Concept”, briefed by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird in 1970, would help reduce defense expenditures in the active force and increase reliance on the units of the National Guard and Reserve. He stated that, “a total force concept (would) be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Guard and Reserve forces. The Total Force Concept brought a new level of support for the National Guard and Reserves. General Creighton Abrams, United States Army Chief of Staff, reorganized the “Total Army” so that the Regular Army could not conduct an extended campaign without mobilizing the Guard and Reserves, thus gaining the involvement and, hopefully, the support of small-town America.”⁷² The Total Force Concept proved to be a boon for the National Guard initially but would cause issues in the future.

The heavier reliance, by organization and policy, on the National Guard and Reserves; coupled with the professionalism increase of the all volunteer force, the technological capabilities increase (Maneuver, Aviation, Intel sensors, etc) in equipment and the doctrinal underpinnings of Air Land Battle brought the force to a stunning level of capability. The overwhelming victory in Desert Storm showed the effectiveness of the Total Force Concept. While the enemy cooperated

⁷¹ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng-history.htm>

⁷² Ibid.

in providing the conditions for their own defeat, it still required a highly disciplined, well-trained and equipped force with an overarching doctrinal concept, to hasten their demise.

In the glow of the overwhelming defeat of the Iraqi forces in Desert Storm, some controversy would arise in the relationship between the AC and the ARNG. While many ARNG units performed with valor in Desert Storm, three maneuver brigades (planned as “round-out” units to Regular Army divisions) would not get the opportunity. The three combat brigades mobilized (the 48th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Georgia NG; the 155th Armor Brigade, Mississippi NG; and the 256th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Louisiana NG) would never leave CONUS. The National Training Center (NTC) validated two of the brigades, but not after some controversy as to their readiness. While ultimately not necessary in the outcome of the conflict with Iraq, concerns were raised as to the ARNG maneuver brigades ability to be ready in a timely manner should a larger conflict arise that would need a sustained effort by the Total Army.

Imperative is the realization that the ARNG (along with the states and governors they serve) and the Active Army made a “quid pro quo” deal that has served both well, but has by proxy, made one organization subservient to the other. Therefore, when the AC questioned the ARNG readiness during Desert Storm, they implicated themselves. The strategic policy of under-manning and under-equipping the ARNG to accommodate a fully ready AC and its weapons programs was a large reason for the ARNG enhanced brigade’s lack of readiness. The preponderance of funding the ARNG receives is through the Title 10 responsibility of the Regular Army. The AC did this to have a reasonably well equipped and trained National Guard, at a fraction of the personnel and overhead costs, to help in sustaining a major land operation. The states and the ARNG accepted this, because they could provide a robust capability to the governor, which would be cost prohibitive for almost any state to fund and maintain on its own. This arrangement worked fine in the world prior to and during the Cold War, where maintaining a tiered and partially manned force structure, which then “filled up” upon mobilization, to match the threat. Fiscal concerns and political pressure led to downsizing personnel and structure after

Desert Storm. However, the Cold War proxy relationship of funding by force structure did not go away. “The ARNG has come down from the cold war high water marks of 27 divisions in 1963, and a 457,000 end strength in 1989 to a force of 350,000 by 2000 with an evolving force structure as part of the 1993 off-site and the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study as a result of the Commission on Roles and Missions.”⁷³ This has become a bigger concern as mobilizations have increased since 9/11.

While fiscally prudent during the Cold War, this created a strain, as ARNG units became a lynchpin for sustaining overseas operations like Bosnia, Kosovo and domestic support like Hurricane Andrew and the 1996 Olympics. The incidents and aftermath of 9/11 exacerbated this relationship even further as the ARNG filled missions across the “full spectrum of operations.” Further complicating the problem was the SECDEF decision to move away from the accepted process of mobilizing units under the existing planning and deployment structure. Rather, it became an ad hoc affair during OEF and OIF, which suited the immediate operational needs but forced a convoluted use of the mobilization system and the further exacerbated the AC/ARNG “readiness relationship.” In order for a unit to mobilize, it must be at a C1 standard. Yet prior to and after Desert Storm the practice of resourcing units in the ARNG at C3 remained the norm. See Figure 1 below for the different “C” readiness levels. Therefore, when large mobilizations were required for operations after 9/11, units had to be cross-leveled to make mobilizing units meet the C1 standard. In certain cases, some units went below C4 readiness to “round out” other mobilizing units. In C4 status, a unit is ineffective and is essentially “broken” until returned to a C3 level with additional funding. The proxy relationship of the AC and the ARNG has combined to worsen chronic equipment and personnel shortages for the ARNG in the COE.

⁷³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arng-history.htm>

**Criteria for Readiness Ratings in U.S. Army Reserves under
UNITREP System, Mid-1980s**

Category	Condition			
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
Personnel (percent)	90	80	70	Less than 70
Equipment-on-hand (percent of items above 90 percent fill-rate)	90	80	65	Less than 65
Equipment condition (percent of High-priority equipment rated mission capable)	90	80	65	Less than 65
Training (weeks required)				
Division, brigade, battalion	0-2	3-4	5-6	over 7
Company	0-1	2	3-4	over 5

Figure 7 - Criteria for Readiness Ratings⁷⁴

Therefore, if the ARNG Transformation is to work properly it must address two key issues. These two issues are domestic planning and by extension resource allocation. The next chapter will provide details as to why these two issues are necessary in providing for ARNG force structure.

⁷⁴ Binkin, Martin and Kaufmann, William W. U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks: Studies in Defense Policy. Wash D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1989

ISSUES IN ARNG TRANSFORMATION

Domestic Support Planning

“All Army components (Active, Reserve, National Guard) are involved in Homeland Defense. The change brought on by the onset of the GWOT necessitate a range of policy, organizational, doctrinal and force structure changes to address challenges to our homeland – particularly – irregular challenges.”⁷⁵

Changing the planning and prioritization of domestic support missions is crucial. Turning again to FM 3-07, the concept for linking tasks to unit readiness in preparing for several missions becomes apparent:

The major Army command, Army service component, continental US Army, and corps commanders determine the battle focus, resources, and METL that maintain the required readiness posture for anticipated operations in war or military operations other than war. For planned stability operations and support operations, unit commanders may adjust, their battle focused training to reflect the unique aspects of these operations. For units deployed to conduct stability operations or support operations with little or no preparation, their war fighting competencies will sustain them as they adjust to the stability operation or support operation.”⁷⁶


Theoretically then, transformation will provide a ready force for any contingency, foreign or domestic. This would allow planners to use the same concept to source domestic missions based on most likely contingencies. Doing this then justifies the level of forces and resources needed, as opposed to the ARNG supporting domestic missions through ad hoc resorting requirements. As shown in the Figure 9 below, this concept of linking plans to resources has an established and formal procedure in preparing for major contingency operations abroad. This process links objectives and effects necessary to complete an operation and allows for the realistic estimation of what forces are required for an operation.

⁷⁵ Department of the Army, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005*, The Army Plan, Washington, D.C.: HQDA.

⁷⁶ Department of the Army, *Stability and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Feb 2003. para 2-84.

Linking Plans To Resources Combatant Commander Driven

- Stage I
 - Identify critical effect for each plan
 - By phase or line of operation
 - Identify joint capabilities needed to achieve each critical effect
 - Using Tier I and Tier II Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
 - Identify Programs that can resource each capability area
- Stage II
 - Identify shortfalls, sufficiencies, and overmatches in capabilities for each effect
 - Identify JCAs where the commander is willing to accept additional risk
- Stage III
 - Identify mitigation strategies for high risk priorities
 - Program adjustments
 - New system development
 - Concept development
 - Bases, Cooperative Security Locations
 - Political arrangement (overflight, ACSA, ...)
 - Allied Acquisition



28 January 2006

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Figure 8 - Linking Resources to Plans

As Hurricane Katrina showed, the issue domestically is working through the myriad problems of control of resources and their application. Using a proven planning technique and identifying critical shortfalls and vulnerabilities will do more to help civilian and military leaders than creating force structure for specific contingencies. This will require NORTHCOM to plan accordingly as suggested here, “DOD should transfer Executive Agency responsibility for MSCA to NORTHCOM and NORTHCOM should rely on the NG to provide JFHQs to C2 military forces when they are provided for a disaster response mission...All military units would be available to NORTHCOM on a rotational basis.”⁷⁷ This is not without its issues however, “One of the major challenges ahead is the determination of the proper command and coordination relationships among the TAGs, NGB, NORTHCOM, DOD and the Department of Homeland Security. While the direct command authority between DOD and NORTHCOM is clear, the formal relationship between NGB and NORTHCOM remains ambiguous.”⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Gilion, Joseph B. *A Future Proposal for the DODs Role in Response to Domestic Disasters*. Report for EM 506 – Emergency and Disaster Theory, 14 Dec 2004.

⁷⁸ *Army National Guard History*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arnghistory.htm>, p 29.

“Effective response requires a commitment of time and resources before a disaster occurs, which in turn requires a commitment by Army leadership to the disaster relief mission within the emerging vision of the Army of the future. This commitment will ensure that individuals and units receive adequate training, resources, and recognition for their disaster response role.”⁷⁹

Changing the Resource Paradigm

“Proper funding and budget oversight for homeland defense and CBRNE consequence management missions is vital. Currently, the Department accounts for homeland defense activities through a variety of disparate programs and funding lines in every Military Department and combatant command and numerous initiatives under the purview of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Funding for homeland defense is not accounted for consistently.”⁸⁰




Figure 9 - Total Army Force Structure⁸¹

⁷⁹ Schrader, John. *The Army's Role in Domestic Disaster Support: An Assessment of Policy Choices*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993, p 17.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p 38.

⁸¹ Department of the Army, *2004 Army Transformation Roadmap*, Wash D.C., Jul 2004, p 39.

Referring to Figure 8, the ARNG Force Structure fits into the Total Army plan. The pyramid provides a good conceptual framework for understanding how the Army will support its primary mission of war fighting, while still operating across the spectrum of operations. The redesign to brigade formations will create the depth necessary to sustain the NMS while stabilizing the force. While the overall force structure is shrinking, as discussed in Chapter 1, the plan is to fully “man” and “equip” the formations, unlike the Cold War. The transformation of the ARNG force began in earnest in 2003 and is on pace to be completed by 2010, which is in line with current Army plans. This is occurring without any plans for “growth” to the end-strength of the ARNG, which will remain at around 350,000 personnel.

A major point brought out in Figure 8 as well is the idea that required = authorized. As mentioned earlier (the decision to fund the ARNG at C3 across the board) by civilian and military leadership, on a construct of “empty structure” that could be mobilized if necessary is outmoded. This “empty structure” was theoretically a valid requirement but was only partially authorized or funded by civilian and military leadership. Again, a prudent fiscal decision, however, it created a “have and have not situation” because fully funding the Active Component divisions was the priority for fulfilling the Army’s primary missions. The construct of partial funding made sense during the Cold War, because the Active Component covered the operational requirements, for the most part. However, as Total Army, end strength came down after Desert Storm and operational requirements went up, the ARNG became necessary to fulfill these requirements. Force Structure came down as well, but much of it stayed and remained “empty” to fit the budgeting construct that is still in effect. Over time, this funding construct created units that were below the readiness levels required to be “alerted and mobilized” quickly. Now that DOD has recognized this conundrum, its transformation plan hinges, for the most part, on fully funding the modular structure. The National Military Strategy states it well, “Given current force levels and appropriate resources, this strategy is executable. While US conventional military capabilities are, and will likely remain, unmatched for the near future, demands on the Armed Forces across the

range of military operations remain considerable. If the ARNG is to pursue the Global War on Terrorism, conduct stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, ensuring power projection from the Homeland and sustain global commitments while protecting the long-term health of the Armed Forces will require actions to mitigate risk. Commanders must develop options to balance demands like transformation, modernization, and recapitalization that, if unrealized over the long-term, could make it increasingly difficult to execute this military strategy.”⁸²

However, problems in funding needed equipment for transformation are occurring already. “Even before 9/11, equipment shortages were the hallmark of the National Guard’s existence. After the terrorist attacks and engagement of the most Guard troops in overseas operations since World War II, the situation has only gotten more serious...LTG Steven H. Blum, chief of the National Guard Bureau, last year announced the Guard would need \$20 billion to reset from the war on terror, with \$7 billion requested in an emergency spending bill.”⁸³

⁸² Department of Defense. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2004, p 22.

⁸³ Prawdzik, Christopher. *Equipment vs. Personnel*, National Guard Magazine, Washington, D.C.: NGAUS, January 2006.

CONCLUSION

The argument most often heard against an operational and modular ARNG (that is treated the same as the Active Component) is that you are asking one organization to do too many things and do them well. That the ARNG trains and equips itself to conduct major combat operations, and then is required to have the skills to keep the peace in both foreign and domestic situations seems patently unfair. Critics further claim that Modularity will rely too heavily on the ARNG since ARNG personnel only work and train part-time and that Guardsmen only signed up “in case they were really needed”.

The reality now, though, is the ARNG has become an operational force that by tradition and necessity is fulfilling many security roles. The perception of the ARNG as a strategic reserve, that is only necessary when there is a crisis abroad or at home, just no longer meets the current reality. The ARNG is now required to sustain operations abroad and still be prepared to support a myriad of missions at home. Now, in order for the ARNG to operate in this new reality, the old model for how the ARNG is postured just does not apply anymore. Now more than ever fully providing the planning and resources under Transformation will provide the most capability to operate across the spectrum of operations. While the current transformation is expensive, it pales compared to the cost of creating the additional capability (personnel and equipment) and funding it in the Active Component. In the previous cold war construct of seemingly unlimited budgets, a large, specialized military was possible. It would have been possible to have a concomitant constabulary and domestic specific force specifically maintained and only called when needed. The reality now is that a force must be able to do as much as possible within its inherent structure.

The plan for ARNG Transformation, as laid out, is an effective plan for meeting the national security needs over the next generation. Modularity gives the Army and the States requisite capability. AC/RC Rebalance creates more of the needed skill sets for the current

environment while divesting the ARNG of “empty” force structure. What will make the ARNG more capable or inversely, what will weaken its efforts is if Congress and DOD continue to fund the ARNG based on the old construct of tiered readiness. Funding must now equal requirements. Further, DOD should use the established planning process with the combatant commands to plan and source domestic contingency missions through NORTHCOM. The struggle to provide capability and options to our leaders, as they respond to an uncertain operating environment, should not contain flaws in logic by proposing easy solutions.

Dr. Doubler states the overall argument well and in paraphrasing his thoughts, the essence of the argument is captured: “The Army must question its paradigm for determining total force structure by relying solely on requirements tied directly to the conduct of overseas combat operations and allow for the activation of ARNG units intended for homeland security missions. The belief that the ARNG should be relegated only to homeland security missions is a mistaken notion that ignores our nation’s centuries old reliance on citizen-soldiers as a necessary augmentation to Regular Forces. As a federal, military institution, the Army’s three components – Regulars, Guardsmen and Reservists – share responsibilities for defending CONUS. To that end, the Army Leadership must work to insure that all of its components receive the necessary resources required to protect the American People.”⁸⁴ Once again, an organization that has a *set of plans for all its likely missions, resources to match its requirements*, and organized to *operate over time and space* provides an organization that is capable, flexible and fiscally prudent enough for the needs of the U.S. National Security.

⁸⁴ Doubler, Michael D. Guarding the Homeland: The Army National Guard and Homeland Security, Arlington, VA: AUSA, Dec 2002, pp 34-35.

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